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I.

INTRODUCTION

State regulation of municipal solid waste commerce is a traditional
exercise of a state's police powers. States have the inherent power to
legislate for the protection of public health, safety and morals under
the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution.' Solid waste
regulation has, in practical effect, largely escaped the congressional
2
intervention so prevalent in other fields of environmental protection.
Therefore the field has, by default, assumed center stage in the federalism
theater, and a state's power over solid waste commerce is constrained
only by the United States Constitution. This constraint emanates from
two sources: (1) the application of the negative implications of Congress'
plenary power over interstate commerce, known as the dormant com* LL.M., University of Utah; J.D., University of Puget Sound; Policy Analyst, Texas Institute
for Applied Environmental Research, Tarleton State University.
** LL.M., Vrije Universeit, Brussels, Belgium; J.D., University of Kentucky College of Law;
Director, Mineral Law Center and Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
I. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The existence of these state powers is essentially taken for
granted in the solid waste field, which is to say that the courts always analyze the issues of
constitutionality from the viewpoint of limitations on these powers. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978): "[W]e assume New Jersey has every right to protect
its residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment. And it may be assumed as well that New
Jersey may pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills,
even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected." Id. For a discussion of this case,
see infra note 19.
2. The Congress has flirted with regulation of municipal solid waste, but its efforts thus far
have centered principally upon the regulation of hazardous waste. In City of Philadelphia, the
United States Supreme Court found "no clear and manifest purpose" to preempt the field of
municipal solid waste regulation through operation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act [hereinafter RCRA]. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 621 n.4; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6901(4)
(1976): "[C]ollection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function
of State, regional, and local agencies." Id. Amendments to RCRA have led to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's promulgation of minimum national standards in certain municipal waste management areas, such as landfill design criteria; however, this field is still in
large part the province of state regulation. See 40 C.F.R. § 241.100 (1990) (guidelines); 56 Fed.
Reg. 50,978 (1991) (new minimum federal criteria).
At the time of this writing, Congress is considering measures that, if enacted, will permit state
regulation of interstate commerce in solid waste. See 136 CONG. REc. S13,447, S13,450 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1990) (The Senate passed the Coats/McConnell amendment to the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988), as an amendment to the District of Columbia Appropriations
Act, Fiscal Year 1991.).
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3 and (2) the preemption of state action by specific
merce power doctrine;
4

acts of Congress.

The core issue in the federalism cases involving solid waste is deceptively simple. Unless Congress has preempted a field of regulation,'
or has expressly authorized the state regulatory action, 6 the question is
whether the state's regulation unconstitutionally interferes with interstate
commerce. This apparent simplicity quickly evaporates, however, when

one realizes that mixed questions of fact and law underpin most elements
of the dormant commerce power doctrine.' Hence, case outcome pre-

diction is a rather risky proposition,8 notwithstanding the Supreme

3. The United States Constitution states that the Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes ..
"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The commerce clause has long been interpreted as both an authorization
for congressional action and a restriction on permissible state regulation, notwithstanding the
possible absence of conflicting federal statutes. This is commonly referred to as the dormant
commerce clause doctrine; we prefer dormant commerce power doctrine. See, e.g., Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
4. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes that the Constitution
and laws enacted by the Congress "shall be the supreme law of the land" and "shall be binding
on the states." U.S. CoNsx. art. 6. Preemption of state laws will be recognized in three types
of circumstances: (1) the federal legislation contains an explicit preemption provision (express
preemption); (2) the federal legislation is sufficiently comprehensive to create the inference that
Congress intended to occupy an entire field of regulation (implied preemption); and (3) although
the federal law does not entirely displace state law, the particular state regulation actually conflicts
with federal law. See Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1442 (S.D.
Cal. 1988). Although the RCRA allows states to impose more stringent environmental standards
affecting waste disposal practices than the federal program, the act preempted the city's effort
to block siting of an experimental waste incinerator because the development of the project had
been approved by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and projects of that type
were strongly encouraged in the act. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 721-22 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991) (Congress
must expressly authorize state actions interfering with interstate commerce). For a discussion of
this case, see infra text accompanying notes 127-37.
7. See ENGDARL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM § 11.11, at 293 (2d ed. 1987) ("The often
inconsistent stumbling from case to case, emphasizing the factual peculiarities of each and
occasionally tendering some reconciling explanation, is typical indeed of common law methodology."); see also Committee for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 142-43 (D.N.J. 1938)
("If there could be some theory of quarantine it is applicable only in the field of physical science.
Ideas are not Japanese beetles.") (citing Hannibal & St. Joseph R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465,
472 (1887)).
8. Justice Scalia, no fan of the current state of dormant commerce power jurisprudence, has
argued on several occasions that the Court's application of the doctrine has been, in effect,
inconsistent and overreaching. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
2323, 2344 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia there states:
The "negative" Commerce Clause is inherently unpredictable-unpredictable not
just because we have applied its standards poorly or inconsistently, but because
it requires us and the lower courts to accommodate, like a legislature, the inevitably
shifting variables of a national economy. Whatever it is that we are expounding
in this area, it is not a Constitution. Because our "negative" Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is inherently unstable, it will repeatedly result in the upsetting of
settled expectations.
Justice Scalia forecast the longevity of this commerce clause liberalism prior to his joining the
Court:
[T]he trend toward more economic liberalism and free trade exists among precisely
those people who also participate in another recent trend-a trend toward less
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Court's recent fascination with mechanical tests breaking dormant commerce power analyses into the broad categories of facial discrimination
and incidental discrimination. 9
Of course, where there are rules there are exceptions. Unfortunately,
the exceptions in the dormant commerce power field are no clearer than
the principal doctrine itself. These exceptions are sometimes classified
as either quarantine cases 0 or market participation cases." Neither
operative term will necessarily appear in cases of either genre. 12 This
article discusses proofs under the quarantine theory. Professor Charles

judicial activism. The individual now sitting on the Court who's most likely to
favor free trade principles and to disfavor state involvement is Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, who also is the justice most likely to let the states do whatever the
devil they want to, even if it is stupid ....
[N]ew members [of the Court] will
often end up conserving the liberalism adopted by their predecessors.
Scalia, Discussion: What Can Economic Analysis Contribute to Understanding Supreme Court
Doctrine?, in REOuLATiON, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 159 n.5 (D. Tarlock ed.
1981).
9. The tests employed by the Court are useful approaches to weighing facts within a legal
framework, yet they can be deceptive if the importance of factual presentment is underestimated.
The tests break down along the lines of whether the state regulation in issue is facially discriminatory
or incidentally discriminatory. Note that both are premised upon factual determinations. Facially
discriminatory measures will be struck down if they fail to survive the "strictest scrutiny of any
purported legitimate local purpose" and there is an "absence of non-discriminatory alternatives."
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1978). Economically protectionist regulations are virtually
per se invalid under this formulation. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
471 n.15 (1981); see City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
Incidental burdens are subject to a less intrusive balancing formulation. As stated in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970):
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits ....
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
Mere physical classifications of goods or "bads" is not useful. It oversimplifies the inquiry.
The Supreme Court itself is quick to make light of this aspect of its dormant commerce power
jurisprudence. Consider the somewhat flippant statements in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131
(1986), when Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted a factual similarity with Hughes,
441 U.S. 322, a recent case that struck down a regulation comparable to the one upheld in
Maine, by stating "[oInce again, a little fish has caused a commotion." Maine, 477 U.S. at 132.
Justice Stevens in dissent countered that "[tihere is something fishy about this case." Id. at 152.
10. Cf. Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (7th Cir. 1982) (referring to cases
that have recognized an exemption from the dormant commerce clause doctrine for state quarantines
as, in essence, cases recognizing that commerce in "bads" is not commerce at all).
11. The market participant doctrine derives from Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)
(state could favor in-state customers of its state-owned cement manufacturing plant). This doctrine
has been applied numerous times to uphold discriminatory practices undertaken by governmentowned solid waste landfills. See, e.g., Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa.,
883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990) (differential tipping fee
structure at local government-owned landfill, which resulted in long-distance source wastes paying
a higher rate, survived commerce clause challenge because the local government was a market
participant in the market for landfill services).
12. See, e.g., Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th
Cir. 1987) (a market participant case that does not use the common terminology); see also Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (a quarantine case which does not emphasize the term in its
analysis).
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DuMars' contribution to this Symposium Issue is on the market participant doctrine. 3
The law library shelves are well-stocked with the works of authors

with firm enough constitution to attempt reconciliation of the multifarious dormant commerce power cases.1 4 The inherent difficulties attendant to these kinds of reviews are well illustrated both by the number
of works and the wide variance of opinion revealed in the works.15
This contribution to the collection leans more toward pragmatism than
theory. Its objective, frankly, is to cajole the litigators handling dormant

commerce power cases to try the cases in a manner that produces
thorough economic records. Over time, this practice should result in a
clearer doctrine. 6 Improvement is certainly needed. Despite the growingbody of reported dormant commerce power cases (many of which are
in the solid waste field), 7 as well as those which are pending before
the courts as of this writing, 8 definition of the doctrine remains daunting.

13. See also Coenen, Untangling the Market ParticipantExemption to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 395 (1989).
14. In one of the more interesting pieces, Professor Eule has urged resurrection of the privileges
and immunities clause as a vehicle for addressing interstate discrimination matters. See Eule,
Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982). For a possibly rare
view supportive of the current doctrine, see Smith, State Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1254 (1986). Although recognizing the roots of the claims discrediting
dormant commerce power theory, the author states, "the more far reaching claim that in these
cases the Supreme Court has hardly any doctrine other than an amorphous balancing test is
ultimately unpersuasive. Over the past fifty years, the Court has repeatedly asserted that state
discriminations against interstate commerce are strongly disfavored." Id.
15. Consider the following by C. Black:
Nearly twenty years ago, I wrote that the Commerce Clause cases do not seem
to be intellectually manageable and are not likely to become so. I still believe
that for two reasons. First, the concerns dealt with under this deceptively simple,
rather high-level doctrine derived from the Commerce Clause are so multifarious.
It is not going to be easy for us to find legal generalities that have any order
of precision or that lend themselves to any reliable prediction or even advocacy....
Second, drawing a negative inference from the Commerce Clause is a doctrinal
problem that is evident from the cases alone.

Black, Discussion: Explanation and Commentary on the Kitch Thesis, in
AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 100 (D. Tarlock ed. 1981).

REGULATION, FEDERALISM

16. General Douglas MacArthur emblazoned the country's consciousness with his memorable
farewell, "Old soldiers never die, they just fade away." The dormant commerce power doctrine
may, one hopes, be destined for a similar fate. Cf. ENODAHL, supra note 7, at 297 ("It is unlikely
that this bad judicial habit [implied negative federal powers], of such long standing, and to which
the Justices still seem so compulsively attached . . . . will be broken suddenly. One might more
realistically hope that, as federal legislation and agency jurisdiction continue to expand in scope,
preemption will increasingly become the significant issue, and controversies over 'negative implications' (at least as to state regulations) will just gradually fade away.").
17. For a discussion of the dormant commerce power, see infra note 22.
18. Three cases pending at the time of this writing illustrate the recurring nature of these
issues in the solid waste context. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 504 (July 20, 1990) (an industry group is urging the court to strike state
standards that: (1) prohibit import of hazardous waste from states that restrict permitting of
facilities within their borders; (2) give disposal facility access preference to in-state waste generators;
(3) establish quotas on out-of-state waste volumes; and (4) prohibit expansion of in-state waste
treatment facilities if expansion is for the purpose of handling out-of-state waste); National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n v. Casey, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1659 (Jan. 26, 1990) (A trade association
is challenging the Pennsylvania Governor's Executive Order No. 1989-8, which restricts landfill
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In the solid waste area this is the unhappy result of the United States
19
Supreme Court's decision in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
This article explores the evidentiary backgrounds of several contemporary commerce clause cases. The article's premise is that, just as in
other complex economic theory cases, dormant commerce power cases
20
genuinely require substantial proof efforts at trial. One would not
expect an antitrust matter involving significant market definition issues
to be resolved on the basis of mere speculation as to the relevant
market; 21 one should not expect questions of market discrimination in
the dormant commerce power context to be treated any differently.
Thorough approaches to trial court record development are indicated
in this context as well. 22 The plain fact is that most contemporary
dormant commerce power cases, including the solid waste cases, lack
construction to facilities that will accept at least 70% in-state trash and that can prove a
"demonstrated need" for the new facility. This "interim moratorium" also applies to expansion
of existing facilities.); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Ohio, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1122 (Oct. 27, 1989) (The program under attack allows solid waste management districts to exclude
out-of-state waste under their plans. It also establishes moratoria on new capacity, imposes
differential fees on out-of-state waste, and sets certain qualification standards for operators
importing waste to Ohio.).
19. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). The principal problem with City of Philadelphia, from a doctrinal
perspective, is that at first blush it appears to depart from a line of cases that recognized the
right of states to impose quarantines against harmful items. ANDERSON, MANDELKER & TARLOCK,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 691 (1990). This article considers City of Philadelphia in detail and posits that, in large part, weaknesses in the trial proofs, rather than
doctrinal departure, contributed to the result. From the legislative history of Ohio's current solid
waste management scheme, consider A.J. CELEBREZZE, JR., OHIO ATT'Y GEN., MEMORANDUM TO
REP. JOSEPH SECREST, CHAIRMAN ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE, RE: HOUSE BILL 592,
at 2 (Dec. 18, 1987) (available from Bremberg) ("I believe that Philadelphia v. New Jersey ignores
the persuasive argument that other factors [than discriminatory effect], such as public health and
environmental safety, should also be taken into account. Had the Court taken those factors into
account, their conclusion might have been different.").
20. The importance of proofs is readily apparent from the Maine v. Taylor litigation. For a
discussion of this litigation, see infra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.
21. This analogy to the law of antitrust is intended only to suggest that there should be a
general similarity in the nature of findings of interstate commerce discrimination in the dormant
commerce power context and market power in the antitrust context. The point is not that they
are identical ideas, but rather that similar economic analyses may be appropriate as part of the
proofs at trial. This is largely ignored in commerce clause jurisprudence at this time. Compare
the complexity of the 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines, § 2 (Market Definition and
Measurement) with Healy v. The Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). In Beer Institute, a
commerce clause case, the evidence of market impact was rather abstract. Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion states, "[Connecticut's] discriminatory [beer pricing] treatment establishes a
substantial disincentive for companies doing business in Connecticut to engage in interstate
commerce, essentially penalizing Connecticut brewers if they seek border-state markets and outof-state shippers if they choose to sell both in Connecticut and in a border State." Id. at 341.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[n]either the parties nor the Court point to any
concrete evidence that the Connecticut regulation will have any effect on the beer prices charged
in other States, much less a constitutionally impermissible one," and that the Court was relying
upon a "personal forecast" regarding the effects of the regulation. Id. at 347 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Regarding application of the 1984 Merger Guidelines in the context of market definition,
see C. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISOR §§ 3.14-.22 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
22. Apparently, appellate courts will review the factual records in dormant commerce power
cases, at least if the records are germane to the question of the availability of reasonable alternatives
to "discriminatory" regulation, under the lenient "clearly erroneous" standard of review. See
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145 (1986); see also ENGDAHL, supra, note 7, at 284 n.8 (This
review standard tempers only slightly the superlegislative role of appellate courts in determinations
of the "reasonableness" of regulation.).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

adequate proofs at trial. 23 It is this lack of adequate proofs that has
left the courts, at all levels, with a free rein to pull results out of the
ether-the commonly perceived problem in the dormant commerce power
field.
Consider the elements of a typical case. Following findings on possible
preemption or congressional authorization, the matters shape up essentially as a market discrimination case.2 The central discrimination issue
operates at several levels. In essence, characterization of the affected
interstate market is key. 25 The plaintiff has the burden of establishing
facial discrimination against a species of interstate commerce. 26 Concurrently, the plaintiff should endeavor to show that if the court defines
the market broadly relative to the regulation (finds that discriminatory
impacts are "incidental"), then the burden of the impacts nonetheless
overrides any putative local benefits of the regulation. 27
The state defending its regulation must rebut the facial discrimination
claim. If successful, the state should take the added step of proving
that the benefits of the regulation outweigh the incidental impact on
the interstate market defined by the court. 2 On the other hand, if the
state is unsuccessful at rebutting the discrimination claim, it must meet
the burden of establishing that the regulations meet a legitimate purpose
(usually not a difficult proof)29 and that there are no reasonable alternatives to the discriminatory regulations."

23. For a discussion of contemporary dormant commerce power cases, see infra note 30.
24. See, e.g., National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2800 (1991) (litigation over
Alabama statute affecting interstate commerce in hazardous waste raised issues of preemption,
congressional consent, and dormant commerce power).
25. There are many subtleties attendant to market definition in this context. In the quarantine
area, the market is usually defined as all trade in a particular good, as measured essentially at
the jurisdictional boundary (e.g., at the state line). See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1989)
(commerce with Arkansas fish hatcheries considered to the extent it involved Maine buyers). The
solid waste market participation cases have oddly defined the relevant commerce as solid waste
disposal services, a legerdemain to avoid charges that a state is hoarding its natural resources.
26. See J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913,
919 (3d Cir. 1988) ("The essential [discrimination] question is whether the challenged regulation
confers an advantage upon in-state economic interests-either directly or through imposition of
a burden upon out-of-state interests-vis-a-vis out-of-state competitors."); see also BrowningFerris Indus. of Ala. v. Pegues, 710 F. Supp. 313, 317 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (a difference in waste
volume supported regulatory distinctions and, thus, the regulations were not "discriminatory"
within the meaning of City of Philadelphia).
Occasionally, the parties seek preliminary relief which, of course, casts the plaintiffs in the
role of establishing some likelihood of success on the merits. This kind of determination also
invariably requires rebuttal proofs by the state. See Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc.
v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853, 870 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (the district court issued a preliminary injunction
against a statutory requirement of waste character certification by out-of-state health officials,
noting that the requirement clearly treated waste differently based solely on the state of origin
and that the state failed to show a risk of injury before trial on the merits).
27. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). For a discussion of the Pike
balancing test, see supra note 9.
28. Id. at 142.
29. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1978). For a discussion of the Hughes test, see
supra note 9.
30. ENGDAHL, supra note 7, at 284. Regarding the contemporary judicial inquiries into rea-
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EXCEPTION

Also implicit in the older quarantine cases are findings of immediate
health threats and, possibly, a lack of market value of quarantined
goods. 3 ' Neither factor is required under contemporary quarantine jurisprudence, but either may, of course, develop in the course of proofs
32
of regulatory purpose and presence of alternatives to regulation.
claim)
Characterization of the market (findings on the discrimination
33 unless
claim
is usually outcome determinative on the constitutional
either the quarantine or market participant exception is recognized.
Appellate courts review the factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard.3 4 The two exceptions are recognized only in instances of very
with
clear proofs. In recent years, only a few regulations, none dealing
35 There are
theory.
quarantine
solid waste, have been upheld under a
many more cases recognizing an exemption under the36 market participant
doctrine, including several in the solid waste area.

sonableness and adequacy of regulatory alternatives as part of commerce clause jurisprudence,
Professor Engdahl states: "At the trial court level . . . a challenger is not obliged to demonstrate
any adequate means to the state's end; instead, 'the burden falls on the State' to show 'the
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake."'
Id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977))
(emphasis in original).
We analogize this two-tier proof setting to the case of the willful trespasser-the state is, in
essence, the willful trespasser usurping the congressional power. This corresponds with Professor
Engdahl's comparison of commerce power jurisprudence to the common law discussed supra note
7. Note that state regulations are ordinarily presumed to be valid, but the presumption shifts in
the dormant commerce power context if discrimination is shown. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.
The rationale for this shift is not clearly articulated in the cases but no doubt is linked to federal
supremacy.
Regarding the law of trespass as it pertains to our analogy, see, e.g., Kentucky Harlan Coal
Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 53 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Ky. 1932) ("To bring himself within the rule
controlling a claim against a trespasser for damage committed by him by an 'innocent mistake,'
as this term is applied in such cases, the trespasser must allege and prove such facts as will show
his acts were not 'willful and knowingly committed,' or not 'intentional."'). Sometimes states
do not establish proofs to meet a burden at the trial level; the results on appeal are usually
unfavorable in those instances. See, e.g., the discussion of the City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey
litigation, infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877) (characterizing
valid quarantine regulations as defensive measures, noting that states have the right to quarantine
against "convicts, paupers, idiots, and lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge,
as well as persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases; [this is] a right founded . . . in
the sacred law of self-defence").
32. These criteria are part of the older quarantine cases. However, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131 (1986), envelops these points within the proofs of legitimate purpose and lack of reasonable
alternatives to regulation.
33. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management,
910 F.2d 713 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (finding that the lower court erroneously characterized the regulation
as an incidental burden and then overruling on the merits); Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware
Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985) (upholding a solid waste export ban under
the incidental burdens analysis); see also A.J. CELEBREZZE, JR., supra note 19 (arguing for strong
planning-based solid waste stream controls as a means of avoiding the virtual per se standard
of City of Philadelphia).
34. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
35. See discussion of Maine and Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. New York, infra text
accompanying notes 85-121.
36. The five leading market participant cases in the solid waste field are Swin Resource
Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County Pa., 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct
1127 (1990); Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir.
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THE NATURE OF PROOFS IN DORMANT COMMERCE
POWER LITIGATION: LESSONS FROM THE CITY OF
PHILADELPHIA v. NEW JERSEY AND MAINE v. TAYLOR
LITIGATIONS

II.

Contemporary solid waste regulation cases have uniformly rejected
quarantine theory as a rationale for allowing discrimination against
commerce in solid waste. This has been, in large part, a function of
the litigators' chosen theories of the cases. As shown in the following
sections, the United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey3 7 which rejected a quarantine theory as support
for a ban on solid waste imports, involved a woefully inadequate record
on the quarantine point. That record stands in stark contrast to the
record that was before the Court in Maine v. Taylor,3 8 in which the
Court upheld a facial quarantine on bait fish imported into the State
of Maine.
The City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey Litigation
The most striking aspect of the commerce clause portion of the City
of Philadelphia litigation3 9 is the virtual absence of quarantine proofs.
That is, although the state argued that its regulatory actions fit within
the quarantine theory of dormant commerce power jurisprudence, 4 0 it
offered very limited proofs on issues other than regulatory purpose.
There were little or no proofs as to the character of the banned wastes,
associated health and safety risks, or any technological difficulties involved in inspection or management of the wastes. 4' The state did, in
A.

1987); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Shayne Bros. v. District
of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984); and County Comm'rs. v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203,
473 A.2d 12 (1984). See generally Coenen, supra note 13.
37. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
38. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
39. This article is concerned solely with the commerce clause aspects of the City of Philadelphia
litigation. The other aspect of the case involved possible preemption under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"). The New Jersey Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court were in agreement that the RCRA did not preempt municipal solid waste
regulation. Id. The sequence of reported decisions, from the first reported New Jersey decision
through the final United States Supreme Court decision, is as follows: Hackensack Meadowlands
Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority, 127 N.J. Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) [hereinafter Hackensack (Super. Ct.)], rev'd and vacated, 68 N.J. 451,
348 A.2d 505 (1975) [hereinafter Hackensack (N.J. Supreme Ct.)], vacated and remanded, 430
U.S. 141, later proceeding sub nom., City of Philadelphia v. State, 73 N.J. 562, 376 A.2d 888
(1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
40. Hackensack (Super. Ct.), 316 A.2d at 716.
41. We find ourselves highly critical of the state's effort in this litigation. Although we suppose
the efforts were genuine, we doubt that many tears were shed in New Jersey after the United
States Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court. It strikes us as disturbingly
coincidental that the primary beneficiary of the state's loss in City of Philadelphia has been New
Jersey itself, as it has become one of the principal solid waste exporting states. Consider, for
example, the irony of In re Certain Amendments to the Adopted and Approved Solid Waste
Management Plan of the Camden County Solid Waste Management Dist., 214 N.J. Super. 247,
518 A.2d 1105 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986) (state agencies upheld in ordering local governments
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effect, argue that limiting the imports to merchantable wastes (e.g.,
level of regulation than
recyclable metals) showed a less discriminatory
42
wastes.
solid
all
an outright ban on
The City of Philadelphia litigation began as two separate cases. In
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority,43 the chancery court considered the validity of
a statute and regulatory scheme" which prohibited out-of-state wastes
from being disposed of in the Hackensack Meadowlands district in
northern New Jersey. The court's findings were based on affidavits and
the record of testimony at an administrative proceeding. There was no
hearing before the court. 45 It is evident from the chancery court's opinion
that the record made sparse reference to environmental risks associated
with solid waste and, instead, showed a concentration of effort on the
question of New Jersey's landfill capacity."
This enforcement action pitted the state and its agency, the Hackensack
Meadowlands Development Commission, against the Municipal Sanitary
Landfill Authority, a local government agency. Both the state and the
Commission had adopted regulations prohibiting the disposal of out47
of-state origin wastes within the district. The state sought to enjoin
the local government from accepting out-of-state solid waste shipments
at its landfill. 48 For the bulk of its case, the defendant local government49
had the burden of proof with regard to the validity of the regulation;

to export solid waste to Philadelphia). Obviously, the growth of New Jersey waste exports that
followed the City of Philadelphia litigation certainly came as no surprise to state officials. Until
this litigation, New Jersey had clearly not undertaken adequate measures to ensure proper local
government services in the field, further supporting, in our view, the compelling interest of the
state in the result that was ultimately reached at the Supreme Court. See Note, The Commerce
Clause and Interstate Waste Disposal: New Jersey's Options After the Philadelphia Decision, 11
RUT.-CAm. L.J. 31, 38 nn.66-68 (1979) (because the state had subsidized landfills to the point
of creating artificially low prices, there was rapid depletion of site capacities and some incentive
for imports).
42. See Hackensack (N.J. Supreme Ct.), 348 A.2d at 512.
43. The defendant, Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority, brought a three-fold challenge to
the regulatory regime being enforced by the state. This challenge included arguments that the
regulations prohibiting waste imports were invalid, arbitrary and unreasonable, violated due process
of law, and violated the commerce clause and privileges and immunities clause of the United
States Constitution. See Hackensack (Super. Ct.), 316 A.2d at 712.
44. The Waste Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:11-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1987), empowered
the state's Commissioner of Environmental Protection to promulgate regulations prohibiting the
import of out-of-state wastes to in-state facilities. See Hackensack (Super. Ct.), 316 A.2d at 712.
The regulation at issue in Hackensack (Super. Ct.), which was adopted pursuant to the Control
Act, prohibited collectors from disposing of out-of-state solid or liquid waste at sites in the
Hackensack Meadowlands District and likewise prohibited the sites in the District from accepting
such waste. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26-1.5 (Supp. 1977); Hackensack (Super. Ct.), 316 A.2d
at 712-13.
45. Hackensack (Super. Ct.), 316 A.2d at 712-13.
46. See generally id. at 713-14 (discussion of the record).
47. Id. at 712. The City of Yonkers, New York, a user of the landfill, intervened as a party
defendant. Id.
48. Note that under current dormant commerce power jurisprudence, the local government
ownership of the landfill site would probably qualify the regulation under the market participant
exception to the dormant commerce power doctrine. See Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming
County, Pa., 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990).
49. Hackensack (Super. Ct.), 316 A.2d at 713 (addressing the defendants' charges that there
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the manner of proof burdens in the constitutional challenge were less
clear.5 0
The rebuttal proofs offered by the state focused upon regulatory
purpose. These consisted merely of a recitation of the legislature's

statutory findings and affidavits from state administrative officials at-

testing in very general terms to the problem of limited landfill capacity
within the state. The legislative findings stated that out-of-state waste
posed a threat to the quality of New Jersey's environment. The affidavits,
in substance, were apparently not much more developed. The Principal
Environmental Engineer of the State Department of Environmental Protection stated that sanitary landfills "present a pollution danger because
they do not conserve or recover resources but bury them, and because
they severely limit the future use of the land on which they are located."',
The Chief of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management in the same agency

stated that there was a critical shortage of landfill space.52 The state
did not, apparently, raise quarantine arguments centered on waste char53

acter.

In addition to its review of the record, the trial court referred

to legal authorities which had found that solid waste posed aesthetic
as well as disease and contamination risks5 4 and that waste disposal
limited future land use at landfill sites. 5
The Hackensack chancery court struck down the statute and regu-

lations on commerce clause grounds. The court highlighted the failure

of the quarantine proofs by observing, in effect, that solid waste varied
greatly in character and, accordingly, it would not presume a quarantine

was justified. The court stated, "Refusemay be utilized for construction,

landfill, recycling of paper, bottles and metal, and production of electricity." '5 6 The purpose of the measure, the court found, was not environmental protection but rather extension of landfill capacity for the
benefit of in-state users.5 7
was no basis for the legislature's findings, that there was no necessary causal connection between
the regulation and environmental protection, and that the regulation was overly broad, the court
noted that "[t]he statute and administrative regulations are presumptively valid").
50. The court appears to have left the burden of proof on the constitutionality question with
the defendants, although this is not entirely clear. Id. The only reference to the state's proofs
on the issue of discrimination is characterized by the court as a mere rationalization: "DEP and
HMDC rationalize that discrimination is absent because the regulations do not prefer New Jersey
over out-of-state landfill operators or garbage haulers." Id. at 718.
51. Id. at 713.
52. Id.
53. For example, the state apparently did not argue that contamination of municipal solid
waste with hazardous wastes would support a quarantine. The trial court noted that regulations
newly adopted during the pendency of the litigation, and which were not before the court, defined
"hazardous waste" in terms that ."would appear to fall into the category of nonmerchantable
material not subject to the Commerce Clause." Id. at 716 n.l (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 7:14.1 (West 1978)). This reference suggests to us that the state did not offer proofs of possible
hazardous waste dangers of municipal solid wastes. The new regulations were at issue in the trial
of the City of Philadelphia lawsuit. The Supreme Court had the new regulations before it in
City of Philadelphia as well.
54. Hackensack (Super. Ct.), 316 A.2d at 717 (citing Shaw v. Byram Township, 86 N.J.
Super. 598, 602, 207 A.2d 570, 572 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965)).
55. Id. (citing Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n,
120 N.J. Super. 118, 122, 293 A.2d 426, 428 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972)).
56. Id. at 165, 316 A.2d at 716. The source of the court's facts do not appear in the opinion.
57. Id.
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In the second case, the City of Philadelphia challenged New Jersey's
1974 statute and regulations that, unlike the regulations at issue in
Hackensack, established a state-wide ban on waste imports. The constitutional challenge to New Jersey's statute was the subject of cross
motions for summary judgment. The court issued an oral order finding
the regulations unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds; appeal
was from that order. It appears that the state's proofs were again
centered on legislative findings, this time as embellished in the 1974
amendments.5 8 These new findings stated:
The Legislature finds and determines that . . . the volume of solid
and liquid waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment
and disposal of these wastes continues to pose an even greater threat
to the quality of the environment of New Jersey, that the available
and appropriate land fill sites within the State are being diminished,
that the environment continues to be threatened by the treatment
.and disposal of waste which originated or was collected outside the
State and that the public health, safety and welfare require that the
treatment and disposal within this 9 State of all wastes generated
outside of the State be prohibited.1
Neither the exact terms of the City of Philadelphia chancery court's
orders nor the nature of any findings adopted are apparent from the
reported court decisions. It is only indicated that this trial court found
that the statute and regulations violated the commerce clause. 6
In reversing the two trial courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court
crafted an opinion fitting of the subject area, which is to say that it
makes for a rather difficult read. The essence of the court's holding
is that prohibiting the import of solid waste that has no intrinsic value,
i.e., putrescibles as opposed to valuable recyclable metals or fuel sources,
is supportable because the waste does not qualify as a constitutionally
protected article of commerce. The court relied upon the quarantine
cases as authority, although it did not dwell on the proofs (or, more
precisely, the lack of proofs) that were in the record before it.
The analytical approach adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court
argued, first, that declining landfill capacity was itself a health justi-

58. This inference is drawn from the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision. See Hackensack,
68 N.J. 451, 453, 348 A.2d 505, 507 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975) (briefly discussing the proceeding
brought by the City of Philadelphia against the state and footnoting to legislative findings).
59. Id. at 453, 348 A.2d at 507 n.l (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-9 (West 1978)).
60. The lower court proceedings involving the City of Philadelphia are described succinctly
by the New Jersey Supreme Court as follows:
In January, 1974, in a separate plenary suit, the City of Philadelphia, together
with other plaintiffs mentioned above, filed a complaint seeking a declaration
that the Waste Control Act, as well as the regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto, violated the Constitutions of both the United States and the State of
New Jersey. ... On March 25, 1974 the trial judge (not the judge who had heard
the Hackensack Meadowlands case), on cross-motions for summary judgment,
rendered an oral opinion declaring that N.J.S.A. 13:1I-9 *and 10 effected an
improper discrimination against interstate commerce and were hence unconstitutional.
Id. at 455, 348 A.2d at 509.
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fication, in part because of the court's sense of ecological harms effected
by new landfill development. 61 Second, the court reasoned that regulation
of the environmental protection field is a part of the state's police
power. 62 It should, in effect, be given greater weight than it has historically been given because of increased contemporary understanding
of the problems associated with environmental degradation. 63 Third, the
court found that the ability to physically separate solid waste into either
materials with intrinsic economic values or "throw away" materials
with no value implicitly indicates that only part of the municipal solid
waste stream is a constitutionally protected article of commerce.6
The New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis of the environmental consequences of solid waste disposal, reflecting the record before it, is
rather thin.65 The court's analysis acknowledges that the quarantine
authorities require a two-pronged finding that the materials under regulation lack market value and pose "immediate threat to human health,"
but it has little to offer on the health point.6 The court did conclude,
apparently from context, that the justification for the statute and re67
gulations rested on ecological values.
To emphasize the declining landfill capacity problem, the court chose
to supplement the meager trial record by taking judicial notice of certain
state reports, as well as the current status of regulatory affairs in the
field of solid waste. Generally, all of the surveys and reports considered
by the court confirmed the critical shortage of landfill capacity existing
in the state, especially the shortage of space in northern New Jersey. 61
The court also projected that limiting landfill use "may be of crucial
importance in preventing further virgin wetlands or other undeveloped
lands from being devoted to landfill purposes. '"69 There was no reference

61. For the principal discussion of the landfill capacity problem, one issue that was developed
in the record, see id. at 456-58, 348 A.2d at 510-12.
62. Id.
63. This discussion is set out at the end of the opinion. The court relies in part on the much
revered opinion of Justice Holmes in Georgia v. Tennessee, 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ("This is
a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the state
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within
its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests
and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air."), quoted in Hackensack, 68 N.J. at 462, 348 A.2d
at 519.
64. See Hackensack, 68 N.J. at 458, 348 A.2d at 512.
65. The court offered that many of the landfills in the state were "located within ecologically
sensitive areas, such as floodplains, and wetlands, or on State-owned public trust tidelands" that
posed special problems for use as landfills. Hackensack, 68 N.J. at 456, 348 A.2d at 510.
66. Id.at 459, 348 A.2d at 513.
67. The court stated that:
[Tihe objectives of the statutes and regulations in question are not only to preserve
the health of New Jersey residents by keeping their exposure to solid waste and
landfill areas to a minimum, but also to preserve for the benefit of both present
and future generations the natural habitat and ecological values which landfill
usage would destroy.
Id. at 462, 348 A.2d at 516.
68. See id. at 455-56, 348 A.2d at 509-10.
69. Id. at 457, 348 A.2d at 512.

Winter 19901

QUARANTINE EXCEPTION

to the record for this projection. The court's analysis of the state of

regulatory affairs examined the federal and state activity and noted a
more significant level of activity at the state level. Notably, activity at
the state level included the development of a New Jersey Solid Waste
Management Plan. 70 The New Jersey Supreme Court, nonetheless, chose
to conclude that "very little has yet been done-in any really effective

level to achieve a satisfactory
way-on either a national or an interstate
' 71
solution to this pressing problem.
The court's conclusion that solid waste could be physically separated

as either articles of commerce subject to dormant commerce power

doctrine protections or materials exempt under a quarantine theory
apparently arose from the regulations at issue in the City of Philadelphia's side of the case. Those regulations exempted certain categories

of solid waste from the import ban, such as metals suitable for recycling. 72 The court's reliance on the quarantine authorities is somewhat
more tenuous. Apparently unable to cite authority on the health effects
of solid waste imports, the court in summary fashion listed 73the several
cases that have applied the quarantine theory with success.

The United States Supreme Court, in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey,74 reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court and held that the ban
on out-of-state solid waste, 75 even as redefined in terms of merchantable
and non-merchantable categories in the 1974 regulations, 76 violated the
Id. at 457-58, 348 A.2d at 511-12.
The court states this point at the outset of its analysis of the picture of regulatory affairs.
457, 348 A.2d at 511.
See id. at 459, 348 A.2d at 513.
Id. at 458-59, 348 A.2d at 512-13.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
The statute provided:
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which originated
or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be
fed to swine in the State of New Jersey, until the commissioner [of the state
Department of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such action can
be permitted without endangering the public health, safety and welfare and has
promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the treatment and disposal of
such waste in this State.
Id. at 618-19 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN § 13:11-10 (West 1978)).
76. The 1974 regulations provided:
(a) No person shall bring into this State, or accept for disposal in this State,
any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial
limits of this State. This Section shall not apply to:
1. Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey;
2. Any separated waste material, including newsprint, paper, glass and metals,
that is free from putrescible materials and not mixed with other solid or liquid
waste that is intended for a recycling or reclamation facility;
3. Municipal solid waste to be separated or processed into usable secondary
materials, including fuel and heat, at a resource recovery facility provided that
not less than 70 per cent of the thru-put of any such facility is to be separated
or processed into usable secondary materials; and
4. Pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical waste, bulk liquid, bulk semiliquid, which
is to be treated, processed or recovered in a solid waste disposal facility which
is registered with the Department for such treatment, processing or recovery,
other than by disposal on or in the lands of the State.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7. § 1-4.2 (Sup. 1977), quoted in City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 619
70.
71.
Id. at
72.
73.
74.
75.
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dormant commerce power doctrine. Rejecting the New Jersey Supreme
Court's quarantine theory analysis,7 7 the Court broadly interpreted the
meaning of "objects of commerce":
All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection;
none is excluded by definition at the outset ....

[W~e reject the

state court's suggestion that the banning of "valueless" out-of-state
wastes by ch. 363 implicates no constitutional protection. Just as
Congress has power to regulate the interstate movement of these
wastes, States are not 7free from constitutional scrutiny when they
restrict that movement.

The Court analyzed the statute as a facially discriminatory measure,79
applying the strictest scrutiny to the state's regulatory means and ends.
In the absence of an exception to the dormant commerce clause doctrine,
this determination led the court to a finding of virtual per se invalidity. 0
Those commentators in agreement with the court's broad view of
"objects of commerce" distinguish the quarantine cases. 8' These commentators agree that the quoted passage should be read as affirming
the importance of proofs, not as signaling the demise of the quarantine
theory in the context of solid waste or, for that matter, any other
market. Clearly the idea of excluding goods by definition at the outset
is not necessarily a required element of quarantine. As shown in subsequent cases, proper proofs can sustain a quarantine regulation.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that interstate commerce in
solid
waste should fall within the quarantine theory. Justice Rehnquist relied
principally upon Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Co.:82
Under [the Bowman line of cases] New Jersey may require germinfected rags or diseased meat to be disposed of as best as possible
within the State, but at the same time prohibit the importation of
such items for disposal at the facilities that are set up within New

77. Apparently, New Jersey presented information on the environmental harm potential in its
brief to the Court. Cf. Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1309, 1332-33 n.130 (1989) (indicating that Appellee's Brief at 37-40 stated that landfills create
aesthetic harms). Whether this kind of information had been developed in the record below is
not clear.
78. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622-23 (emphasis added).
79. The Court stated:
[W]hatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. Both on
its face and in its plain effect, ch. 363 violates this principle of nondiscrimination.
Id. at 626-27.
80. Id. at 627.
81. At least one commentator views this call of the Court as correct. See Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L.
REV. 1091, 1270 (1986) (arguing that Maine v. Taylor stands for the proposition that the particular
problem a quarantine is aimed at, if to be upheld, should not exist locally, or that, if it does,
local controls comparable to the effect of the quarantine should be in force).
82. 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888).
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Jersey for disposal of such material generated within the State. The
physical fact of life that New Jersey must somehow dispose of its
own noxious items does not mean that it must serve as a depository
for those of every other State. Similarly, New Jersey should be free
under our past precedents to prohibit the importation of solid waste
because of the health and safety problems that such waste poses to
its citizens. 83
Justice Rehnquist apparently was satisfied with the level of proof before
the New Jersey courts (or at least was satisfied with the state courts'
ability to determine the adequacy of the proofs). Justice Rehnquist was
with the majority in Maine v. Taylor,8 4 which is discussed in the following
section.
The Maine v. Taylor Litigation

B.

The Maine v. Taylor litigation began as a criminal prosecution before
a federal magistrate; the magistrate's report and recommendation was
accepted by the district court.8 5 Maine intervened at trial and later
appealed to protect its statute from constitutional challenge. 8 6 The state
statute at issue provided that "[a] person is guilty of importing live
bait if he imports into the State any live fish, including smelts, which
are commonly used for bait fishing in inland waters." '8 7 Federal jurisdiction was under the authority of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981,88
which make it a federal offense "to import, export, transport, sell,
receive, acquire or purchase in interstate . . . commerce any fish or
wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law
... of any State." 8 9
The government's proofs included extensive expert testimony on pathogens in parasites associated with imported fish and the impact of
introducing exotic, non-indigenous fish into the state's fresh water fisheries. Both points were argued in support of the discriminatory measure.
Witnesses from the state, testifying on behalf of the government, identified three particular parasites that might be found in imported bait
fish, two of which had been found in the seized load of golden shiners
that formed the basis of this prosecution. The other was known to
occur in bait fish found in the state markets.9 Taylor produced an
expert in rebuttal, whose argument-in-chief was that the particular parasites identified by the state experts were generally not a serious problem

83.
84.
85.
1985),
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.

City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 632.
477 U.S. 131 (1986).
United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393 (D. Me. 1984), rev'd, 752 F.2d 757 (1st Cir.
rev'd sub nom., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131. (1986).
Id.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7613 (1979).
16 U.S.C. §§ 3372, 3373 (1981).
Id. § 3372(a)(2); see Taylor, 585 F. Supp. at 394.
Taylor, 585 F. Supp. at 395-96.

78
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in the wild, but rather were a problem in the unique hatchery environment. 9'
The government's experts, in testifying about the deleterious effect
of exotic species on the native ecology, described Maine as having a
very limited native wild fish population that was particularly vulnerable
to competition from exotics. One particularly unique aspect of the fishery
is the wild population of landlocked salmon, which is vulnerable to
competition because of very limited natural food sources. 92 Taylor, a
fish dealer, and Taylor's expert argued that the risk of exotic introduction
was minimal because of hatchery practices. 93
The district court was satisfied with the magistrate's finding that the
disputed testimony was not an adequate basis for overturning the state's
ban on imports. The court stated:
[T]he constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause cannot
be read as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until
potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until
the scientific community agrees on what disease organisms are or
are not dangerous before it acts to avoid such consequences.94
Having met its burden on the health aspect of quarantine, the state
was charged with establishing the lack of reasonable alternatives to the
outright ban. The government experts testified that, as to the bait fish,
there were not any existing sampling and certification procedures. This
unavailability was due primarily to scientific debate and disagreement.
Although both sides agreed that certification procedures might be possible, the court found "that abstract possibility does not constitute the
applicable standard." 95 The court also rejected Taylor's assertion that
the lack of scientific agreement precluded Maine's discriminatory conduct: "On this record, the lack of agreement among the experts is not
sufficient to justify imposing on the State of Maine the unpredictable
and potentially disruptive risks which are present here."
The district court denied Taylor's motion to dismiss the indictment,
and the defendant was thereafter convicted. A panel of the United
9 7
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Taylo
reversed the district court on the ground that the Maine statute violated
the commerce clause and that Congress had not consented to the interference with commerce. 9 The dormant commerce power aspects of
this decision are reviewed below.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 396-97.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 397.
95. Id. at 398. The court noted as an example the magnitude of the effort that was employed
to develop these kinds of procedures for salmonids. Id.
96. Id. at 398.
97. 752 F.2d 757 (lst. Cir. 1985).
98. Congressional consent may be given to state actions that blatantly interfere with interstate
commerce. The intent must be "unmistakably clear." South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wun-
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The government, on appeal, conceded that the Maine statute was
discriminatory and was subject, therefore, to heightened scrutiny under
the formulation of Hughes v. Oklahoma,9 9 with the state required to
meet a burden of proof on the points of legitimate local purpose (in
this case, demonstration of health impacts and impacts of exotics on
the state ecology) and availability of alternatives per Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission. 0" The panel first found that the
statute bore similarity to the New Jersey statute the United States
Supreme Court invalidated in City of Philadelphia. The Maine statute
encompassed all fish, not just diseased ones; it barred all imports, rather
than imports for release to the wild only; and, it did not apply to instate sources of the same fish. 10'
The First Circuit, unlike the lower court, found a strong aura of
economic protectionism present in Maine's scheme and questioned the
asserted environmental protection motivations of the measure. Because
of its analysis of the alternative means inquiry, however, the court did
not find it necessary to resolve the question of legitimacy of purpose. 0 2
The First Circuit found Maine's rationale that the state could not
depend on persons outside its control for inspections, or that inspections
were impractical, unpersuasive. The court reached this conclusion because
the state, at least with respect to "cold water fish" imports, clearly
engaged in the very practices it argued were not feasible in this context.
The court simply could not believe that Maine had met its burden of
proof or that it had searched for the least discriminatory alternative. 0 3
The United States Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit in Maine
v. Taylor,"°4 finding that the Maine statute was not violative of the
commerce clause.' 5 This is a curious decision given the outward similarities (other than strength of record) to City of Philadelphia, and it
bears close scrutiny. After clearing hurdles posed by the very odd
procedural context of the litigation, °6 the Court addressed the commerce

nicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91-92 (1984). The court found that a short paragraph in the official legislative
history of the Lacey Amendments, which was susceptible of varying interpretations, did not meet
this criteria. Taylor, 752 F.2d at 763-64.
99. 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1978) ("[W]e must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates
evenhandedly with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate
local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well
without discriminating against interstate commerce.").
100. 432 U.S. 333, 354 (1977).
101. Taylor, 752 F.2d at 761.
102. Id.at 761-62.
103. Id.at 762-63.
104. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
105. Id.
106. The procedural difficulties with this case were considerable. Taylor, the appellee, argued
that Maine's invocation of 28 U.S.C. section 1254(2), allowing appeals as of right to the Supreme
Court "by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant
to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States," did not confer jurisdiction in a
criminal matter, or, alternatively, that Maine did not have standing to appeal the reversal of a
federal criminal conviction. The Court rejected both arguments and reached the merits. Maine,
477 U.S. at 133-37.
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clause issues. First, the Court recognized that "Maine's statute restricts
interstate trade in the most direct manner possible, blocking all inward
shipments of live bait fish at the State's border."' 0 7 The state conceded
that the Lacey Act Amendments did not contain congressional consent
to the discrimination, but argued that the amendments should be read
as lowering the level of scrutiny applied to this facially discriminatory
measure.10 8 The Court rejected this notion, refusing to distinguish between congressional consent for flat waiver of commerce clause protections or a grant of lesser scrutiny level, and found that both consents
must be express.' 0 9
The Court approached the disparate opinions of the First Circuit and
the district court from the viewpoint of the appropriate handling of
district court findings on appeal. The First Circuit had not expressly
rejected the district court's findings; instead, it treated the matter as
a question of mixed fact and law, and interpreted the evidence as casting
some doubt on the conclusions reached by the lower court. 10 The Court
observed that if this were a civil appeal, a review of the facts would
be subject to the clearly erroneous standard established in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."' The Court reasoned that, at least as to
factual determinations not bearing on the guilt of the defendant, the
rationales supportive of a clearly erroneous standard in civil proceedings
(e.g., judicial efficiency, importance of first hand observation of witnesses) applied in the criminal context. The parties conceded application
of the clearly erroneous standard and, therefore, a ruling on the use
of the standard was not required. The Court was careful to not only
apply the clearly erroneous standard, but also to note "that no broader
review is authorized here simply because this is a constitutional case,
or because the factual findings at issue may determine the outcome of
the case." 1" 2 Thus, review of factual findings in the context of the
state's proofs supportive of state regulation under commerce clause
scrutiny is limited to the clearly erroneous standard." 3 Application of
the clearly erroneous standard and the court's treatment of the record
in Maine v. Taylor highlight the importance of a strong factual record.
The Court found that the specific alternatives question before the
district court-whether scientifically accepted techniques existed for sam-

107. Id. at 137.
108. Id. at 139.
109. Id. at 139 (citing South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984))
("clear expression" of congressional intent required to waive application of the dormant commerce
clause power).
110. Id. at 143-44.
111. Id. at 145.
112. Id.
113. The application of the clearly erroneous standard in Maine v. Taylor was fairly straightforward, given the detailed record. In a subsequent case, the lack of a record on the subject of
out-of-state impacts of certain liquor pricing legislation led the Court to engage in apparent
speculation about market impacts. This occurrence, involving Justice Blackmun, author of the
majority opinion in Maine v. Taylor, is somewhat troublesome and may signal a fairly loose
meaning of the clearly erroneous standard, or at least a willingness to go beyond the record.
See supra note 21 for a discussion of Healy v. The Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).

Winter 19901

QUARANTINE EXCEPTION

pling and inspection of the fish-was one of fact. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court reviewed the case under the clearly erroneous standard
and upheld the trial court's two-fold finding: first, that no testing
procedures existed; and, second, that development of the testing procedures could take a significant amount of time. Significantly, by agreeing with the district court's factual findings on both points, the Supreme
Court further concurred that:
A State must make reasonable efforts to avoid restraining the free
flow of commerce across its borders, but it is not required to develop
new and unproven means of protection at an uncertain cost. Appellee,
of course, is free to work on his own . . . [tests]; if and when such
procedures are developed, Maine no longer may be able to justify
its import ban. The State need not join in those efforts, however.... 114
The Court agreed further with the magistrate's findings concerning the
health effects of parasites and non-native species on the fisheries." 5
Justice Stevens, in dissent, pointed out the somewhat relaxed standard
of proof approved by the majority. Specifically, Justice Stevens observed
that if the state had the burden of proving justification for the discrimination, the ambiguities in the record should work against it, rather
than for it: the magistrate, district court, and Supreme Court majority
had found that the ambiguities in the record worked in favor of the
state.'' 6 Justice Stevens' view may indeed be the statement of the most
likely result that would stem from the contradictory factual record below;
the majority, however, simply found that its review under a clearly
erroneous standard prevented close scrutiny of the fact findings at trial.
Interestingly, the Court also voiced support of the district court's notion
that Maine need not risk even negligible environmental harm in the
face of presumed scientific uncertainty." 7
Closely following the Maine v. Taylor reasoning, Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. New York"" upheld a New York statute prohibiting the
sale of wild birds not born in captivity. 1 9 To achieve this end, the state
adopted regulations requiring recordkeeping of breeders and a leg band
system to identify birds from birth. 20 In finding that this satisfied the
alternatives analysis of Maine v. Taylor, the United States District Court

114. Maine, 477 U.S. at 147.
115. Id. Cf. Note, Maine v. Taylor: Natural Resource Statutes Against the Commerce Clause
or When is a Hughes Not a Hughes But a Pike?, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 291, 299-300 (1989)
("Maine did not uphold its burden of proof. Maine did not prove that importation of live bait
fish would damage its waterways, it only conjectured possibilities. The state only showed that
there was a possibility of either or both of the two suppositions happening. Allowing conjecture
to undermine Commerce Clause scrutiny may create special dispensation for environmental regulations.") (citing United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 762 n.12 (1st Cir 1985)).
116. Maine, 477 U.S. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 148.
118. 658 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 831 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987).
119. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-1728 (McKinney 1984).
120. Cresenzi, 658 F. Supp. at 1443.
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for the Southern District of New York held that the regulations did
not ban imports of birds, prohibit New Yorkers from making sales to
out-of-state purchasers (provided the sales were consummated outside21
of New York), or prohibit quarantining of wild birds in New York.'
III.

POST-CITY OF PHILADELPHIA SOLID WASTE
LITIGATION

Challenges to solid waste regulatory programs invariably address the
City of Philadelphia precedent.' 22 Rarely, however, do these cases consider the significance of record development in justification of quarantine. The general trend is to interpret City of Philadelphia as the
final word on quarantine in the solid waste setting-a patently absurd
conclusion. Some recent solid waste cases, in fact, do not even raise
the issue of quarantine at all. 123 This failure of proof leads to decisions
that blindly apply the so-called virtual per se rule of City of Philadelphia
if the state regulation is facially discriminatory. 24 Absent an exception,
which Maine v. Taylor teaches, a per se violation will probably not be
found without proofs. 25 Most solid waste litigation has focused on
moving the courts' inquiries to a lower level of scrutiny, particularly
in instances of regulatory control over exports, which, theoretically,
should be subject to the same analytical processes as import regula-

tions. 126

121. Id. at 1443, 1447-48.
122. See Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1207-08 (D.R.I. 1987) ("[A]ny discussion
of the constitutionality of a state statute that effectively bans the disposal of out-of-state waste
").
must begin with an analysis of City of Philadelphia ..
123. See, e.g., Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, Ga., 731 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga.
1990); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 556 F. Supp. 182 (D. Md. 1983) (In
both cases, the City of Philadelphiavirtual per se rule was applied with apparently little, if any,
record on the quarantine issue.).
124. In Diamond Waste, the district court applied City of Philadelphiato find unconstitutional
the application of a Georgia statute giving counties the authority to ban municipalities from
shipping out-of-county waste to publicly or privately owned disposal sites within the county's
jurisdiction. The statute at issue stated:
No person, firm, corporation, or employee of any municipality shall transport,
pursuant to a contract, whether oral or otherwise, garbage, trash, waste, or refuse
across state or county boundaries for the purpose of dumping the same at a
publicly or privately owned dump, unless permission is first obtained from the
governing authority of the county in which the dump is located and from the
governing authority of the county in which the garbage, trash, waste, or refuse
is collected.
731 F. Supp. at 506 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-16 (1987)).
125. Id. at 509.
126. See In re Long-Term Out-of-State Waste Disposal Agreement Between the County of
Hunterdon and Glendon Energy Co. of Glendon, Pa., 237 N.J. Super. 516, 568 A.2d 547 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (upholding the state's disapproval of a long-term waste disposal contract
with an out-of-state site on grounds that the local government had failed to secure adequate instate backup capacity). The court reasoned:
This is not a case of economic protectionism or patent economic discrimination.
The policy of [the Department of Environmental Protection] effectuates legitimate
local interests usually subsumed by the police powers and invoked to insure health
and safety. The thrust of New Jersey's policy is to protect our environment over
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Courts have been reticent to imply that states are under an obligation,
legal or otherwise, to address solid waste management in any particular
manner. Obviously, the states must do something about solid waste,
but it is within their discretion to determine what action to take., 27 The
services relationship that states enjoy with out-of-staters is likewise within
2
that prerogative.' 1
Fairly detailed factual records, however, are beginning to appear on
the scene. In National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Alabama
Department of Environmental Management,'29 a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found Alabama's
Holley Bill, which banned importation of hazardous waste from certain
jurisdictions, unconstitutional as a facially discriminatory measure. This
regulation prohibited
the owner or operator of a commercial hazardous waste management
facility located in Alabama from treating or disposing of hazardous
wastes generated in a state other than Alabama, if the other state
either (1) prohibit[ed] the treatment or disposal of hazardous waste
within its borders and ha[d] no facility for such; or (2) ha[d] no
facility existing within that state for the treatment or disposal of
hazardous waste and ha[d] not entered into an interstate or regional
agreement for the disposal of its wastes to which Alabama was a
signatory. 30
Alabama asserted that the measure was designed to encourage compliance
with the congressional policy favoring state capacity assurance for haz-

the long term by insuring the existence of an essential public service, solid waste
disposal, when the critical time and need arrives. Indeed, New Jersey's policy
against reliance on out-of-state disposal actually burdens its own citizens currently
for their ultimate good; it does not burden citizens of other states in any way;
nor does it prevent New Jersey's treatment of out-of-state waste and thus discriminate against others; nor is the ban on the County's out-of-state disposal
here absolute.
Id. at 523, 568 A.2d at 554-55.
127. This is not to say that the courts are oblivious to the benefits of sound regulatory programs.
On the contrary, the courts are generally positive about solid waste management efforts. See,
e.g., Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa., 883 F.2d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990):
[A] state subdivision has used initiative to build a waste disposal facility to
serve its needs. Furthermore, given Lycoming's recycling program, one could say,
as the Supreme Court did with respect to Nebraska's water conservation program,
that 'the continuing availability of [the landfill] is not simply happenstance; the
natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in
which a State may favor its own citizens in times of shortage.' We also take
cognizance of the difficulties often attendant in efforts by municipalities to build
waste disposal sites in light of their unpopularity with local residents.
Id. (citations omitted).
128. See Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1212 (D.R.I. 1987) (The district court
-refused to adopt a "monopoly exception" to the market participant exception. In rejecting this
novel theory, the court observed that other types of governmental services were, in effect,
monopolized by the state (e.g., public education), but that "[clertainly Rhode Island is not
expected to extend these services to out-of-state residents; the same is true of landfill services.").
129. 910 F.2d 713 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
130. Id. at 717 n.7 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-30-11 (1990)).
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ardous waste disposal. This congressional policy, embodied in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 3 '
conditioned state receipt of Superfund money for remedial cleanup
actions upon the state's certification of "capacity assurance" for twenty
years.3 2 The court held that hazardous wastes met the threshold articles
of commerce standard under the commerce clause. The court also
determined that the Holley Bill was discriminatory (subject to application
of the virtual per se standard of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey),'33
34
and that the action of the state had not been authorized by SARA.'
Finding the hazardous wastes banned under the Holley Bill to be
objects of commerce, the court rejected the argument that hazardous
wastes are too dangerous to qualify as articles of commerce, thus
rejecting application of the quarantine exception to the dormant commerce power doctrine. It instead followed an Eleventh Circuit precedent,
Alabama v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,'3 5 which
had relied upon City of Philadelphia. That case concluded that City
of Philadelphia barred distinctions based upon the category of products. 3 6 Moreover, the court noted that, as a ban on wastes from only
certain jurisdictions, the Holley Bill contradicted any argument137that
hazardous waste is too dangerous to be an article of commerce.
The district court had found that the waste stream regulation was
only an incidental burden on interstate commerce, given the legitimate
regulatory goal of complying with the congressional policy embodied
in SARA and, indirectly, because of the overall management effort
Alabama employed. 38 In rejecting this characterization of the burden
on commerce, the Eleventh Circuit panel cited testimony that the types
of wastes accepted in Alabama's Emelle facility "did not vary based
upon the states in which the wastes were generated.' ' 3 9 Thus, the Holley
Bill distinguished between these wastes solely on the basis of their state
of origin.' 4°
Discussing arguments that the Holley Bill fit within the purview of
the quarantine exception to the commerce clause, the court concluded:
Alabama's selective ban on out-of-state hazardous waste is no quarantine law. Alabama did not ban hazardous wastes from all other
states on the ground that the wastes were dangerous to some human

131. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1986).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1980); see National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 910 F.2d
at 716-17.
133. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).

134. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 910 F.2d at 718-19.
135. 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, sub nom., Alabama ex rel. Siegelman
v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 110 S.Ct. 538 (1989).
136. Id.

137. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 910 F.2d at 719.
138. See National Solid Waste Management v. Department of Envtl. Management, 729 F. Supp.
792, 804 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (the district court concluded that Alabama was not isolating itself
from the national economy).

139. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 910 F.2d at 720.
140. Id. at 721.
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health or environmental aspect which Alabama has a right to regulate.
Alabama's ban does not distinguish on the basis of type of waste
or degree of dangerousness, but on the basis of the state of gen-4
eration. The Holley Bill discriminates against interstate commerce.' '
Alabama argued congressional authorization on the premise that the
capacity assurance feature of SARA 42 redistributed power over interstate
commerce. The court, describing SARA as imposing sanctions on nonconforming states, found that SARA did not expressly authorize the
restriction of the free flow of commerce in hazardous wastes. 43 The
restriction would operate to the extent caused by the stoppage of Superfund assistance to site cleanups, but that was not an express recognition that states could deny all shipments on the premise of the
policy. The court noted, "[i]f Congress intended to allow the states to
restrict the interstate movement of hazardous wastes as Alabama has
4
tried to do, Congress could (and still can) plainly say so.'
In J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 45 a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit discussed, at great length, the record developed
in a matter that cleared the hurdle of facial discrimination to be analyzed
as an incidental burden. An interstate waste hauler challenged local
agency rules mandating transfer station disposal. The hauler asserted
injury to itself and its customers because of the doubling of disposal
costs effected by the requirement. The hauler had been bypassing the
transfer station and taking wastes directly to the same out-of-state
disposal site that was the ultimate destination of wastes processed at
l
the transfer station.'
The court rejected the application of a line of commerce clause cases
which had applied the virtual per se rule against facial discrimination.'47
The court noted, "the discrimination prohibited by these cases was the
state's direct interference with the market either for the purpose or with
the effect of favoring home-state interests against out-of-state competitors." '4
The county asserted several justifications for the requirement, including
reduction of truck traffic and a long-range planning benefit resulting
from a change in the destinations of exported waste over time. The

141. Id.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1980).
143. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n., 910 F.2d at 721 (the sanction under SARA
is withholding of Superfund monies for remedial actions).
144. Id. at 721-22. The court references, for comparison purposes, the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b, 2021e(e)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), which provides that
states may enter interstate compacts excluding non-compact states from commerce in the wastes
covered under the act.
145. 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988).
146. Id. at 921.
147. Id. at 920. These authorities include South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82 (1983), which invalidated an in-state timber processing requirement for timber sold at
state sales.
148. J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc., 857 F.2d at 920.
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transfer station, it agreed, would facilitate stable in-county operations
while the export operations changed. These kinds of assertions overcame
allegations of discriminatory purpose. In the absence of a clear discriminatory purpose, the hauler had to show either that the rule "effected
some discrimination against out-of-state economic interests in order to
fall under the per se invalidity [standard] of the processing cases," or49
that it was an impermissible incidental burden on interstate commerce.
The hauler failed to demonstrate either facial or impermissible incidental interference with interstate commerce and thus did not demonstrate commerce clause injury of any kind. Because the receiving
landfill in Pennsylvania received the same material with or without the
transfer station, the brunt of the discrimination was felt in-state in the
form of added costs for using the transfer station in lieu of direct
hauling to Pennsylvania. Thus, in finding the mandatory transfer station
rule non-discriminatory, the Third Circuit relied upon the well-established
maxim of commerce clause jurisprudence that the existence of substantial
in-state interests harmed by a regulation is "a powerful safeguard"
against legislative discrimination. 50
The Third Circuit also found that the hauler had shown "no cognizable
burdens on interstate commerce" and, therefore, the court was not
required to balance the effects of incidental burdens against the local
Nevertheless, the court observed that the local benefits to
benefits.'
the county were substantial; therefore, the balancing test, if applied,
would probably be satisfied. 5 2 The local benefits were substantial because
this transfer station was the county's only disposal site. In addition, it
formed the basis of the county's ability to enter long-term waste disposal
contracts with landfills located outside of the county. In essence, the
transfer station was the centerpiece of the county's waste disposal plan,
and it was a financially precarious centerpiece at that: "On the record
before us, there can be no doubt that the transfer station could not
adequately perform these functions without the Rule, . . . the Rule
therefore directly promotes the county's effective response to the crisis
in solid waste management."' 53
In Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural
Resources, 15 4 the district court upheld against a dormant commerce power
doctrine challenge a state statutory prohibition on landfills accepting
out-of-county solid waste unless pursuant to an approved county solid
waste management plan.'5 5 On summary judgment motion, the court
denied the plaintiffs' request for a declaration that the statute was

149. Id. at 921.
150. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)).
151. If interstate commerce had been burdened, the courts would have been required to balance
the effects of the burden against the benefits of the regulation. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
152. J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc., 857 F.2d at 922.
153. Id.
154. 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991).
155. Id. at 762 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.413a, 299.430(2) (West 1978)).
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unconstitutional because it pertained to importation of out-of-state solid
56
waste for disposal in Michigan.'
The court reviewed City of Philadelphia and Maine v. Taylor'5 7 but,
contrary to the findings in those cases, concluded that the state statute
did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce. 15 8 Although,
arguably, the statute as applied did discriminate,5 9 the court applied
the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.1'6 balancing approach to find that the
incidental impacts on interstate commerce were not excessive in relation
to local benefits. These benefits included the ubiquitous "protect[ion]
of public health and the environment' '1 6' and facilitation of comprehensive planning and management of solid waste disposal at the local
government level. 62 The court found that the requirement of plan
approval prior to import burdened interstate commerce; however, because the plaintiff did not allege that such approval was a practical
impossibility, the court concluded that the burden was not excessive. 63
Thus, it is apparent that only minimal proofs were put forward by the
parties.
A facial challenge to the Illinois Spent Fuel Act' in Illinois v. General
Electric Co. 165 led to a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit finding that provisions banning storage in Illinois
of out-of-state-originated spent nuclear fuel violated the commerce clause.
The court adhered closely to City of Philadelphia, distinguishing the
quarantine cases relied upon by the state.'" It is not clear to what
extent the state, as part of its summary judgment defense below, attempted proofs regarding the hazards of nuclear fuel. The court of
appeals did not examine evidence concerning environmental hazards in

156. Id. The plaintiff also sought declaration that the St. Clair County governmental entities
unconstitutionally applied the terms of the statute in denying its permit application for import
of waste from out of the county. Id. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief on both claims. Id.
157. Id. at 763 ("For every rule, however, there exists an exception. Respecting commerce
clause/police power analysis, the exception is illustrated in Maine v. Taylor.
...
).
158. Id. at 763-64. The court states, in part, "the requirement that importers appear in a
county waste disposal plan applies equally to Michigan counties outside of the county adopting
the plan as well as to out-of-state entities. The court therefore finds that the [act] does not
discriminate against interstate commerce on its face." Id. at 764.
159. The actions that precipitated the litigation were a local government's denial of a waste
import permit. At that point, the discrimination is certainly facial (i.e., all imported waste is
outlawed). The court did not so find, concluding that the county's policy banning all waste
imports was evenhanded (treated all counties in Michigan and out-of-state sources the same) and
consistent with the act. It relied upon Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist.,
820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987), which, although argued by plaintiff to be a "market participant"
case, in this court's view had affirmed the district court's finding of evenhandedness. Bill Kettlewell
Excavating, Inc., 732 F. Supp. at 765-66 n.2.
160. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
161. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc., 732 F. Supp. at 765.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, paras. 230.1, 230.22 (Smith-Hurd 1988).
165. 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1982). This appeal was from
an order of summary judgment; there is no reported district court opinion. See id. at 208 (district
court granted summary judgment motion).
166. Id. at 214.
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depth. It did, however, note that spent fuel posed a long-term risk of
radioactivity and that spent fuel was stored indefinitely following removal
from nuclear reactors. 67 The court made its determination on the basis
of lack of evenhandedness. The court inferred evenhandedness was
present in the older quarantine cases but was lacking in City of Phi6
Washington State Building
8 A similar nuclear waste case,
ladelphia.1
69
& Construction Trades v. Spellman, follows the same reasoning.
IV.

CASE PRESENTMENT STRATEGIES

On the basis of the foregoing, litigators faced with dormant commerce
power doctrine challenges to state regulations should take care to consider
the possible ramifications of a substantial proof effort at trial. Many
of the cases actually reach the appellate courts with a precariously thin
record of factual findings, and dangerously, we think, the appellate
courts are inclined to accept a thin record without considering a remand
to develop the record.
The application of the clearly erroneous standard in Maine v. Taylor
shows that even facially discriminatory "fishy" cases170 can survive
constitutional challenge if the trial court makes appropriate factual
findings. Likewise, a strong factual showing by the plaintiffs can kick
the case into the strict scrutiny arena, making the state's job that much
more difficult.
The proof question, of course, cuts several ways. The challengers, in
order either to establish discrimination or to overcome findings that
"incidental burdens" are outweighed by "putative benefits," must establish market impacts. If discrimination is shown and the burden shifts
to the state to justify its statute under the Maine v. Taylor formulation,
the state must meet a proof comparable in scope to the most difficult
health injury cases. This proof, of course, will support a finding that
incidental burdens are outweighed by the benefits. Mere incantation of
the mystical words "environmental protection" will not meet the test,
other than to establish a valid public purpose, which in any event should
not be difficult. It is in this latter context that legislative history or
codified findings are relevant-certainly language from some source
tending to show that the statute has an economically protectionist purpose can be very dangerous to the state's case.
It probably makes little sense for a litigator in this area to spend
too much time contemplating the case precedents. As we said at the

167. Id. at 208.
168. Id. at 214.
169. 684 F.2d 627, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1982) (Washington
initiative prohibiting import of low-level radioactive waste on asserted environmental protection
grounds paralleled the provisions found unconstitutional in City of Philadelphia and therefore
violated the commerce clause).
170. This is Justice Stevens' apt description in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 152 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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outset, that is an activity with little to recommend it. 7 ' The fact presentments at trial are sufficiently important that "good" facts, in our
view, should overcome the "bad" law most of the time (witness Maine
v. Taylor).
From these impressions, we recommend the following trial outline:
I. For the Plaintiffchallenging the constitutionalityof state regulations
under the dormant commerce power doctrine:
A. Proof of federal preemption
B. Proof of discrimination
1. If successful, rebuttal of Maine v. Taylor justifications
2. If unsuccessful, proof of incidental burden impacts
II. For the State defending its regulations from dormant commerce
power attack:
A. Proof of congressional consent
B. Rebuttal of discrimination claim
1. If successful, proof of incidental benefits
2. If unsuccessful, proof of Maine v. Taylor justifications
3. Possible proof of health impacts and lack of market value
of quarantined goods.
We presume that each step, other than preemption or congressional
consent issues, will entail a substantial factual proof effort.

171. See discussion supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.

